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Abstract 
This paper deals with the perceptions of Europe as developed by the European populist radical right over 
the campaign for the 2019 European Parliament elections. The study is based on the public 
communications of three leading political parties in this spectrum: France’s Rassemblement national, 
Italy’s Lega and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland. By applying image theory in international 
relations, the paper comes to the conclusion that the radical right managed to construct a relatively 
coherent image of the EU as a distant undemocratic actor in sharp contrast to the alternative narrative of 
one ‘Europe of fatherlands’ described in mostly civilisational terms. 
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Introduction  
Over the recent decades, Euroscepticism has become an increasingly popular catchword 
in attempts to explain what is happening in the European Union (EU). Paul Taggart 
(1998), one of the first authors to systematically study and define this concept, points out 
that it is directed against the concrete political outcomes of the European integration. It 
is not just scepticism of the idea of Europe. The reasons for its emergence stem from the 
fact that while the institutional integration of the EU is a clear process, the idea of the EU 
is much vaguer, allows for different interpretations, and, hence, different mobilisations 
against one or another of its forms (Taggart 1998., p. 385). Two decades after Taggart's 
first works on the issue, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2018), leading names in EU 
research, concluded that a new important cleavage had emerged and established itself in 
Europe, separating the national from the transnational. It runs a dividing line across the 
political spectrum, from the far left through political formations of the mainstream, to the 
far right. At the same time, the parties of the populist radical right have a common ground 
in their Eurosceptic orientation and are able to integrate their voters on this basis (Gómez-
Reino & Llamazares, 2013). These parties are not just strong proponents of 
Euroscepticism, but they have gradually increased the weight of the Eurosceptic appeal as 
it is increasingly becoming an essential part of their political identity and a potential field 
for mutual cooperation (Liang, 2007). While Eurosceptic parties are established to be not 
against Europe but for “another Europe”, there is no agreement on what “another Europe” 




Researchers of Euroscepticism tend to agree that views on Europe and European 
unification among the populist radical right vary (McDonnell & Werner, 2019). However, 
a specific motif recurs which Rogers Brubaker (2017) summarises as “civilisationism” to 
denote the shift of emphasis by radical right parties, triggered by the perceived 
civilisational threat from Islam. ‘The nation’ is re-characterised in civilisational terms and 
as a result a new kind of “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983) emerges from the power 
basis of nationalism while it is not merely reducible to it. This shift does not imply a 
common doctrine of European cultural identity but rather a set of shared ideas and 
attitudes. “Civilisationism” (Anderson, 1983) is, first of all, a reactionary mobilisation of 
Europeanness, one directed against the Other, who is argued not to belong to the 
European space (Muslims, migrants, sometimes Eastern Europeans or Jews) as 
supposedly rooted in deeply entrenched and irreversible cultural incompatibility. 
Secondly, it takes Europe as a restrictive community, broadly historically informed and 
shaped by values of ancient Greek democracy, Roman legal tradition and Christianity. 
Thirdly, it invokes the spirit and constructs an idea of a naturally harmonic order of 
coexisting European peoples, bound and characterised by ethnopluralism and 
protectionism. Of course, such a dynamic vision is heavily burdened by contradictions and 
tensions but narratives of “civilisationism” (Anderson, 1983) also carry the potential to 
unite seemingly opposite groups: the liberal and the conservative, the Christian and the 
secular. Its endurance over time is questionable but it should be acknowledged that it 
creates pervasive binaries, drawing on traditionally populist divisions between ‘us-them’ 
and ‘the elite-the people’. In these binary readings, ‘they’ – the peoples and nations outside 
of Europe – cannot be adequately integrated into the exclusive ‘us’. The ‘elite’ – 
symbolised by European institutions – cannot protect the ‘people’ from imminent threats, 
not least as understood to emanate from the dangerous Other (Balibar, 1991, pp. 24-27; 
Betz, 1994, p. 182; Vasilopoulou, 2011, pp. 234-235; De Cesari, Bosilkov & Piacentini, 
2020). 
The European Parliament elections in May 2019 were seen as a turning point in the 
development of European integration. Years earlier, politicians, media and experts had 
warned that the election could be a breakthrough for the radical right and Eurosceptic 
groups. The future of the European project seemed to be in doubt and more threatened 
than ever before, which turns the context and rhetoric prior to the election into a 
particularly representative and noteworthy phase to examine populist and radical right 
groups’ vision for Europe. This paper principally seeks to answer two research questions: 
how do radical, populist parties, in this political and ideological space, imagine the EU’s 
Europe; and how do they see and envision the ‘other Europe’, i.e. the alternative to the 
current status quo? A review of these ‘visions’ inevitably presupposes an assessment of 
their transnational coherence, namely the extent to which they overlap and the extent to 
which they differ among various representatives of the radical right in different countries 
in Europe. 
The paper proceeds as follows: First, the analysis justifies the case selection in accordance 
with the theoretical framework and method of research. Subsequently, this paper will 
discuss images of Europe of three radical right populist groups independently to, then, 
draw on a comparative discussion and their in-depth characteristics in the conclusion.  
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Case selection, theory and method 
In answering the research questions, this paper limits the analysis to three radical-right 
populist parties: France’s Rassemblement National (RN), 1  Italy’s Lega (LN) 2  and 
Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)3. There are several reasons for the selection 
of these three groups for the analysis in this paper. To be sure, the absence of Central and 
Eastern European cases is noticeable, and the radical right likewise advocates visions of 
Europe in Central and Eastern (Pirro, 2014, pp. 618-620) (see Deimantaitė in this Special 
Issue). Yet, the focus on Western Europe is driven not by disregard but by an assessment 
of the potential of radical-right groups to influence large audiences. Influence in this paper 
is assessed by electoral performance and by self-perceived representations of the parties 
as being from founding nations of Europe. This paper refers to three lead-EU member 
states, whose domestic political processes undoubtedly have pan-European effects. The 
three examples are also interesting from the point of view of international cooperation 
among the radical right. Despite AfD’s initial leaning towards the European conservative 
family, all three parties eventually joined the new radical right political group Identity and 
Democracy in the European Parliament.  
To examine if ‘another Europe’ was gaining momentum during the 2019 election 
campaign, this paper argues it useful to clarify what images of Europe are behind the 
messages of the radical right. Existing perceptions of the EU, as already established, can 
influence the support of, or opposition to, European integration (Mišík, 2013, pp. 456-57). 
In this paper, influence is understood through the role and strategic use of alternative 
narratives in telling the story of Europe in the 21st century. Strategic narratives are defined 
as instruments of political actors to construct a “shared meaning of the past, present, and 
future of international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and international 
actors” thereby determining “who we are” and “what we want” on the path to exerting 
influence over others (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle, 2014, p. 2). ‘Alternative 
narratives’ (see Introduction to the Special Issue) are challengers to existing 
interpretations that aim to not simply eliminate the opponent’s narrative but also destroy 
the conditions which make it viable (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle, 2014, p. 104). So 
far, the scholarship in strategic narratives has not paid sufficient attention to the role of 
political parties as narrators in the space of narrative contestation. 
While strategic narratives shed a light on the identity of a political actor, the latter’s images 
of Self and Others may clarify their role and behaviour in politics. That is why, beside 
strategic narrative theory, this paper also draws on image theory in international relations. 
Three discourses inform image construction: elite opinion, media framing and public 
opinion (Chaban, Elgström & Gulyaeva, 2017). This paper is interested in the opinion of 
the radical right’s elite actors, in other words, of leaders of the respective parties and their 
representatives who drive campaigns. Images include certain dimensions: the intentions 
of a political actor to either preserve or revise the status quo; a perception by others of the 
actor’s power as rising or declining; a view of domestic structures and norms that reveal 
cultural, economic and political settings. Images relate both to others (external images) 
and to ourselves (internal images). Stereotyped images – friends, powerful friends, 
 
1 Until June 2018 the party was called the National Front (Front National) which is still its more popular name 
compared to the current one, the National Rally. 
2 In 2018 the party which had been previously called Lega Nord (the Northern League) was rebranded as just Lega 
(League). Nevertheless, it is still more popular under its previous name and that is why this paper sticks to the 
abbreviation LN. 




enemies – can emerge as a combination of characteristics perceived along these 
dimensions (Elgström, 2000, pp. 3-6, 73-75). Through the components of such images, 
scholars can assess whether the images that different actors create, suggest an opportunity 
or a threat (Herrmann, 2013, p. 340). The radical right in the 2019 European elections 
offers a pertinent opportunity to test the theory. The “tricky” point in this paper is to 
disentangle the mixture of “images of a political project ('the EU') and a fuzzy dream of 
identity ('Europe')” (Didelon-Loiseau & Grasland, 2014, p. 92). 
The approach in this paper is based on a qualitative critical discourse analysis of political 
communication. It is employed as a problem-oriented method through which texts are 
examined for properties that have contributed to their ideological shaping in order to 
reproduce the discursive reality and critically examine identities and visions proposed by 
political actors (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). The task is to identify references to ‘Europe’, and 
correspondingly ‘European’, ‘EU’ and ‘Brussels’, by coding the appropriate language units 
in relation to Europe’s intentions, capabilities and status. The paper will proceed by 
contextualising and interpreting the main image components in the data. It draws on two 
channels of communication: the election manifestos and the official Twitter accounts of 
each party (RN, 2019a; RN, 2019b; LN, 2019; AfD, 2019a; AfD, 2019b).  
While the former allows tracing a more strategic vision of the political actors, the latter 
represents its practical development and prioritisation in the course of the election 
campaign. It should be noted that one of the political forces -- Italy’s LN -- never published 
its manifesto but claimed to adhere to the program of the European radical right party 
family (Tronconi & Valbruzzi, 2020) The preference for Twitter compared to other social 
media networks stems from the fact that the media allows for short and clear messages 
and is frequently used by all three political parties and is used with the highest intensity. 
Statuses posted on Twitter are also accompanied by intertextual links to articles and 
videos in other media, which have also been subject to examination in this paper. This 
paper starts the examination from 26 March 2019 – two months prior to Election Day 
because it is when the campaigns actually start, and the European theme increases in 
relative shares, and ends with the Election Day on 26 May 2019 (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Radical right’s coverage of Europe on Twitter from March 26, to May 26, 2019. 
Political party RN LN AfD 
Total number of 
tweets (excluding 
replies) 
1306 2273 234 
Tweets referring to 
Europe 
291 149 166 
RN’s perceptions 
The EU in the eyes of France’s RN is built against the European peoples (‘cette UE qui se 
construit contre les peuples’, RN, 2019a, 23.05.). It is narrated to threaten normal lives 
and as failing to protect its own (European) businesses and citizens. Europe in this view 
seeks to anesthetise nations from their memories and is driven by greed and selfishness 
with the intent to establish a harmful dictatorship of the economy over nations. RN views 
the EU’s ambition as intending to destroy the most important political asset of modernity: 
the nation-state. RN argues that the EU’s ‘open-door policy’ has left European societies 
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with a “civilisational choice” (“choix de civilization”, RN, 2019a, 21.05.), ‘Africa or us’ and 
has already opted against the will of its members. 
The alternative advocated by RN mirrors the alleged status quo. In terms of purposes, ‘the 
other Europe’ supports, takes care, promotes local businesses, protects jobs and borders 
and defends fatherlands, in particular the conception of the “Home of France” (“La 
Maison France”, RN, 2019a, 20.05.). In contrast, the EU is perceived as lurking darkly 
and uncertainly behind its shiny façade. Further, the EU is described as a realm of 
unfulfilled promises. The EU, according to RN, is no longer a dream for Europeans but a 
concern that requires a deep change as it is stuck in a paralysis behind big words and vague 
ideas.  
RN thus proposes that the EU needs replacement by a respectful alliance of nations which 
should regain and promote Europe’s international authority. Moreover, RN suggests that 
its alternative vision of Europe will prove to be a successful barrier against globalism and 
uncontrolled capitalism, and, thus favouring local interests of Europeans. 
The current EU, RN claims, is not equipped to address the demands of today and the 
Union is presented as detached from international realities; it is metaphorically 
conceptualised as the “eunuch of history” (“eunuque de l’histoire”, RN, 2019b, p.12). 
Behind the EU’s ambitions looms the desire to unify everything, stifle creative energy and 
impose low standards. According to the party, the EU does not develop popular affiliation 
with itself; on the contrary, it crushes all other affiliations and needs to be reminded that 
“our fatherland is not Brussels” (“Notre patrie ce n’est pas Bruxelles”, RN, 2019a, 10.05.).  
Moreover, RN seeks to focus on the shortcomings of globalisation: the lack of identity, 
expressed in the indiscriminate expansion and intrusion of the “utopia of a Europe 
without borders” (‘utopie d'une Europe sans frontières’, RN, 2019a, 17.05); the lack of 
tradition that has turned the whole of Europe into a “gigantic market” (“un gigantesque 
marché”, RN, 2019a, 07.05) into which cheap products from all over the world are poured 
and thus set to ruin local producers; the lack of democracy that handed over the power of 
the European peoples to an unelected European Commission, which in turn makes the 
behaviour of Brussels’ institutions totalitarian and anti-democratic.  
Further, the EU is narrated as rigid and dogmatic and relies on outdated concepts of free 
movement and competition; in fact, the EU is regarded as helpless in handling the 
demands of the modern world by adhering to no other standards than market logic. It is 
likened to a “hampered giant” (“un géant entravé”, RN, 2019b, p.16) who walks blindly 
against the course of history and the world. In the long run, it is narrated as resembling 
the communist doxa on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall, stuck in repetitious cycles of 
historical clichés, and left with nothing but irreparable disappointments as to their empty 
promises and policies that are bound to betray expectations.  
In contrast to the past, RN underlines the coherence and continuity of their desired 
Europe in contrast to the EU. First, unlike the EU, this Europe has a history and the EU’s 
60 years of existence are a short amount of time in the grand cycle of Europe’s thousands 
of years of development, which emphasises Europe’s unique viability and resistance. The 
“genius of nations” (“le génie propre des Nations”, RN, 2019b, p.3) has made it possible 
to survive while so many others did not. Second, unlike the EU, this Europe has tradition. 
RN insists on Europe being not an ideological construction but rather a living reality which 




that invented nations. RN narrates borders as natural and alien to petty political 
speculations, in fact, timelessly valid. In this narrative, who belongs to Europe is not for 
politicians to decide but a natural deliberation of geography, history, and civilisation. 
Third, unlike the EU, Europe has a democracy that arises from the will of nations. In this 
view, the strength of cultures and their inbuilt wisdom become the bulwark against 
extremism and separatism and against non-Europeans who incite European conflicts. In 
RN’s view, Europe makes the nations and they make Europe. 
In terms of a short assessment, RN employs anti-globalist and anti-liberal positions to 
merge them with a strong emphasis on a national romanticism. 
LN’s perceptions 
Italy’s LN narrates the EU as having caused too many disasters. The Union wants to 
demonstrate the inferiority of member states publicly so that their ministers stay on the 
side-lines of power. According to LN, the EU also seeks to deprive European nations of 
having a say in multilateral agreements and from exerting international influence. 
Instead, the EU is understood to serve other interests because it encourages the spread of 
criminal activity across Europe, while its leaders indulge in a hedonistic lifestyle which, 
however, according to LN narrative, is doomed to end soon. LN claims that through its 
policies, the EU has brought the European nations to a fateful choice between saving 
Europe and leaving an “Islamic state based on fear and precariousness” (“uno stato 
islamico fondato sulla paura e sulla precarietà”, LN, 2019, 12.05) to the children of 
Europe and future generations.  
LN is convinced that saving Europe means a willingness to defend its community, family, 
rights, values, rules, culture, history, tradition, and (Christian) religion. LN’s desired 
Europe should look to protect and control its borders and not engage in fruitless 
ideological debates such as those opposing communists and fascists. In this way, LN 
claims to go beyond Italian history’s radical trends and stick to the ‘common sense’ of 
‘common Italians’. 
The EU’s resources are considered important because necessary reforms could only be 
achieved through the acting European institutions but according to LN, European elites 
are consciously weakening these resources by focusing on efforts to relegate important 
spheres of control to international organisations such as the WTO. In doing so, LN argues 
the EU takes power from European citizens and willingly hands it to foreigners. In 
contrast, LN’s description of desired change is only vague. The power of Europe should be 
strong enough to protect its external borders and the ‘made in EU’ trademark vis-à-vis the 
outside world but weak enough to promote strong nation-states. 
Further, LN claims that what characterises the EU now is an idea, drowning in past 
illusions and detachment from people. The Union is said to have betrayed its fundamental 
principles and has ended up creating more obstacles for citizens instead of helping them. 
Brussels’ elites are presented as living in nostalgic self-delusions while, at the same time, 
their project based on just business and finance has turned from “a dream into a veritable 
nightmare” (“non è un sogno ma un incubo”, LN, 2019, 08.04.). LN sketches an image of 
the distance from Brussels to ordinary citizens but also the elites’ greediness by drawing 
on the recurring metaphor of “palaces inhabited by the European bureaucrats” (“palazzi 
dei burocrati europei”, LN, 2019, 11.04). For LN, the EU of today is an embodiment of the 
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alliteration: “burocrati, banchieri, buonisti o barconi” (“bureaucrats, bankers, advocates 
of tolerance, barges of immigrants”, LN, 2019, 29.04). 
LN’s suggested alternative to Europe, in contrast, has to be attractive to everybody inside: 
“a future Europe where Europe’s children can dream” (“l'Europa in cui i nostri figli 
possono sognare”). LN sees Europe’s strength as derived from a historical ‘truth’, i.e. the 
inheritance of a great civilisation with Christian roots. This civilisation brings together the 
legacy of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome and proves simultaneously that Italy’s place in the 
European family is ‘natural’ and indispensable. LN appears to argue that Italianising 
Europe is pivotal for the transformation of the Union and it takes “bringing more Italy to 
Europe” (“portare più Italia in Europa”, LN, 2019, 24.05.). Finally, LN seeks to reaffirm 
a conception of Europe as a place of “security, peace, identity, work and family” (“sicura, 
di pace, identità, lavoro e famiglia”, LN, 2019, 02.05.). 
LN’s overall stance may be revealed as one of anti-elitism and cultural traditionalism 
presented as a constant struggle for national self-affirmation. 
AfD’s perceptions 
Germany’s AfD sees the EU as having devastating effects on nation states, cultures, and 
citizens. Firstly, the EU is portrayed as increasingly and unduly interfering with national 
issues and thus endangers their sovereignty. Through the introduction of the single 
currency and its migration policies, the EU is considered to incite conflict among nations, 
and what is more, makes Germany pay for other countries’ debts. Secondly, the AfD argues 
that the EU seeks to replace nations by “communalising” (“Vergemeinschaften”, AfD, 
2019a, 23.05) them and, thus, intends to artificially create a uniform European culture, 
which erodes ‘real’ cultures. Thirdly, the AfD argues that the EU ignores citizens and their 
interests and by opening gates to migration it marginalises local populations in a shrinking 
and ageing Europe. The EU is depicted as unable to do what it wants but powerful enough 
to destroy what it rejects.  
In general, the current EU is narrated as lagging behind the standards of democracy and 
transparency; it functions as an undemocratic construct, shaped by large and expensive 
bureaucracies. It ultimately has become a real “bureaucratic monster” (“bürokratisches 
Monster”, AfD, 2019a, 23.04) which pays salaries that exceed that of the German 
Chancellor herself. For the AfD, the EU lives in a separate world characterised by “lobby 
madness” (“Lobby-Wahnsinn”, AfD, 2019a, 03.05), a world in which all important 
decisions are made behind the scenes of its façade politics. Worse, the EU, in the view of 
AfD, draws on the past and resembles the former totalitarian East Germany while it 
dreams of a “European super-state” (“Europäischer Superstaat”, AfD, 2019b, p.11). For 
the AfD, this “super-state” ignores the distinct cultural identities of nations, while the EU 
has no common cultural identity.  
The AfD suggests that Europe should, instead, limit its purpose strictly to an agreement 
between European states based on mutual recognition and non-interference. The AfD 
envisions a Europe that is reduced to its core tasks, fostering opportunities for national 
development of each member state, which means that cooperation is considered useful 
only where several states can do better than a single one. The AfD’s vision involves no 
common regulatory bodies, common structures of governance or joint long-term 




proposes an “intergovernmental association” (“zwischenstaatlicher Zusammenschluss”, 
AfD, 2019b, p. 13). 
The AfD labels its alternative to the “super-state”, a “Europe of fatherlands” (“Europa der 
Vaterländer”, AfD, 2019b, p. 7). It derives its legitimacy from century-long traditions of 
popular sovereignty and democracy, dating back to the Enlightenment. For the AfD this 
means that today such a Europe should not permit the domination of a country by another 
country, should not infringe upon national responsibilities and sovereignty, and should 
‘preserve’ the integrity of national culture and language. Europe itself is narrated to be a 
“fortress” (“Festung Europa”, AfD, 2019a, 20.05.) which, firstly, allows for only a limited 
number of legal migrants as, according to the AfD, there is no “human right to Europe” 
(“Menschenrecht auf Europa”, AfD, 2019a, 07.05.), and secondly, keeps a traditional 
vision of lifestyle and culture that denounces the “unrealistic ideologies” 
(“wirklichkeitsfremde Ideologien”, AfD, 2019b, p.17) of European elites.  
In short, AfD is developing some version of protective nationalism marked by 
simultaneous appeals to conservative identities and political pragmatism. 
Conclusions 
The three examined political parties developed strategic narratives of Europe in 
accordance with their traditions, the domestic political context and the current situation. 
The differences in emphasis are therefore unsurprising. However, this study also finds a 
more or less coherent general perception that share similarities and is, therefore, also 
relevant for a transnational reading of the populist radical right (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Image of the EU among the radical right parties 
Political 
Party 
Intentions Capabilities Status Evaluation Stereotype 
RN Evil Weak Inferior Threat Enemy  
LN Evil Strong, on 
the decline 
Inferior Threat Enemy 
AfD Evil Strong Inferior Threat Enemy 
In all three cases, the EU stands in opposition to ‘Europe’, which extends temporally (‘past’ 
vs. ‘future’) and epistemologically (‘utopia’ vs. ‘realism’). The EU is characterised mostly 
negatively and described in terms of bureaucratic control, administrative negligence, 
alienation from people, unrepresentative policies, materialist pursuit of profits, globalist 
aspirations of unification of everything and at all costs, dogmatism and inadaptability, and 
ultimately is said to resemble communist totalitarianism. Brussels serves to symbolically 
materialise this description of the EU, and the alternative narrative of the ‘other Europe’ 
enables juxtaposition to the negatively connoted EU. This ‘other Europe’, advocated by all 
three parties, presupposes respect for the ‘will of the people’, rejects mass migration, 
protects national identity, culture and language, is ‘loyal’ and confined to Europe’s 
historical and spiritual roots, mostly narrated through traditional values. All three parties, 
thus, envision their dream of the ‘other Europe’ as a ‘Europe of the Fatherlands.’ In all 
similarities, some principal differences between the parties are evident. Such differences, 
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for example, concern issues of ecology, religiousness, and taxation. The disagreements in 
the evaluation of the EU’s capabilities are, however, superficial and the commonalities 
remain dominant.  
While the image of the EU is constructed as external to the parties and the European 
peoples, the EU as a political actor shares the same physical space with its opponents. 
Europe appears to be the “ontic space” for the radical right. “Ontic spaces” (Ejdus, 2017; 
Ejdus, 2020) relate to material environments incorporated into state identity narratives 
as spatial extensions of the collective Self. The introjection of “ontic spaces” denotes the 
process of absorption of the material environment in the project of the Self for the 
purposes of self-assertion (Ejdus, 2017; Ejdus, 2020). Non-state actors such as radical 
right parties seek to develop a similar territorial materialisation of desire. Europe is the 
“ontic space” (in the above sense) that can justify and provide territorial materialisations 
of their nationalist agendas, while serving as the land that substantiates the claim to the 
‘other Europe’. The radical right seeks to present its political identity as the imaginary 
shared identity of the EU member states and their peoples, which, in turn, requires the 
territory of Europe. In short: the EU must be taken out of Europe. The alternative 
narrative of Europe is outlined in such a way as to suggest naturalness. It is not an issue 
of replacing one European order with another. The issue is to replace the non-European, 
in other words the external, with the ‘natural’ European, or otherwise the internal. Image 
theory allows for an understanding of how the political behaviour of certain actors enables 
the narratives and perceptions they construct. 
The campaign for the 2019 European Parliament elections certainly proves that narratives 
and images of Europe on the populist radical right are seminal to the self-representation 
of this political camp and suggest important routes for research in European politics. 
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